Husserl, following his teachers Franz Brentano and FriedrichPaulsen, states that philosophy is science. However, philosophy is not one specialised science among many, but universal: not “a” science, but “the” science. Philosophy and science in their most general form seek knowledge not only of nature and its history, but also of humanity and its history, not only of events and facts, but also of actions and ideas. “Science” should not be limited to what Husserl calls “positive sciences”, the sciences of (the objects of) experience in complete abstraction from the experiencing (subject) itself.

Yet this is exactly the conception of science that prevailed then and seems to also prevail now. Something is objective precisely insofar as it is not subjective. Even the subject itself must be objectified and made measurable, reduced to a physical fact, like the brain or behaviour. We can study the mind only indirectly. This is often also made explicit in policy documents where the Geisteswissenschaften are described as actually not concerned with the human mind itself, but only with its (historical) products, i.e. measurable facts and things.

It is this absurdity that Husserl adresses in the Crisis. Husserl argues that all sciences are inseparable branches of philosophy. Sciences of the mind and of nature are equal in scientific character. The division of labour in universities in separate faculties of natural sciences and humanities and social sciences etc. does not reflect an essential subdivision of science as such, but merely the practical organization of human activities. In terms of “scientificity”, all disciplines face their questions with the same rigour, whether they are about facts or values, about things or thoughts.

Such considerations about the scientific character of philosophy and the sciences have direct implications for the value of science as well.